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STATE SECURITIES REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE LAND SALES
Promoters frequently finance land development by selling sub-
division lots on installment purchase agreements., When such develop-
ment schemes are poorly financed, they constitute high-risk investments
for buyers who may lose their investment if the promoter encounters
a cash flow problem or the buyer fails to make an installment pay-
ment.2 While many promoters actually build planned communities,
others sell subdivision lots on undeveloped land of questionable
value as "investments."3  To guard against abuses in the sale of
subdivision lots, land offerings are now regulated in many states.4
1. See M. PAULSON, THE GREAT LAND HUSTLE 70 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as PAULSON].
2. Id. at 10, 70-71, 103. See also Hearings on S. 275 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Ses. (1967); Hearings on S. 2672 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Frauds & Misrepresentations Affecting the Elderly of
the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Carberry,
Home on the Range: Investors Speculating in Land Often Find Profits Are
Elusive, Wall Street J., Apr. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
3. See PAULSON, supra note 1, at 11-12. See generally TAsx FORCE ON LAND
USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' POLIcy GUIDE TO
UNMAN GROWTH 263-93 (1973).
4. Thirty-four states now have statutes or administrative rules affecting the
sales of subdivision lots. California, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont and
Washington regulate certain subdivision lot sales under their securities laws. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10238.4-49.5 (Deering Cum. Supp. 1973); id. §§ 11000-21
(Deering 1960), as amended, (Deering Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 751 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1975); Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 409.401(l)
(Supp. 1975); OHIO Rlv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.01(B), 1707.33 (Page Supp.
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1602(J) (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202(9) (1971); WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.005(12)
(Supp. 1973). Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah have statutes modeled after the Uni-
form Land Sales Practices Act. ALASxA STAT. §§ 34.55.004-.046 (1971); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 478.011-.33 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 484-1 to -22
(Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3301 to -3323 (Supp. 1974); MONT.
Rav. CoDEs ANN. §§ 67-2101 to -2136 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1974);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 356-A:1 to :22 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§1 34-38-1 to -10 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 57-551 to -571 (Supp.
1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-11-1 to -21 (1974). For the text of the uniform
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One aspect of this regulation is illustrated in the case of Florida
Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick5 in which plaintiff-appellant, Florida
Realty, offered to sell subdivision lots located in Florida to Missouri
residents. A prospective buyer was required to sign an installment
purchase agreement6 which the Missouri Commissioner of Securities
considered to be within the definition of a "security" in the Missouri
Uniform Securities Act.7 Accordingly, Florida Realty's transactions
were subjected to the requirements of the Act.8 Florida Realty sought
act see HANDBOOK OF TnE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 339-61 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. The other
eighteen states with some control over sales of subdivision lots or foreign real
estate have various approaches involving registration, inspection or permit sys-
tems. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2181 to -2185.04 (Supp. 1974); COLO.
tEv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-61-401 to -407 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
20-329a to -329b (1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-5801 to -5814 (Supp. 1974);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 371-89 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -402 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 41, §§ 81K-GG
(1974); MiChe. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.1286(1)-(3) (Supp. 1975); MNN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 83.20-.42 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-886.01 to .07 (1971);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-16.1 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-3-1 to -9
(Supp. 1973); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 337-39(c) (McKinney 1968), as
amended, (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-23.1-01 to -23 (Supp. 1973),
as amended, (Interim Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 92-.205-.245 (1973);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 36-21-45 to -53 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32-2-1 (1972); Wis. ADn. CODE, ch. REB 5.01 (1972). Wisconsin's regula-
tion is a rule of the Wisconsin Real Estate Board.
5. 509 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1974). For additional commentary on this case see
6 URBAN LAW., No. 2, at ix (1974).
6. 509 S.W.2d at 116.
7. The Act reads, in part: "'Security' means any note; ... bond; debenture;
... investment contract; . . . or any contract or bond for the sale of any
interest in real estate on deferred payments or on installment plans when such
real estate is not situated in this state or in any state adjoining this state; . .. ."
(emphasis added). Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.401(l) (1969). For commentary
on the Act see Bateman, Missouri Uniform Securities Act, 34 Mo. L. Rev.
463 (1969); Logan, Blue Skyways and Byways of Missouri--Amendments
to Uniform Securities Act and Regulations, 29 Mo. B.J. (pts. 1-2) 446, 542
(1973); id., 30 Mo. B.J. (pts. 3-7) 37, 112, 159, 231, 305 (1974); Logan,
Blue Skyways and Byways of Missouri, 25 Mo. B.J. (pts. 1-4) 460, 511, 584,
609 (1969); id., 26 Mo. B.J. (pts. 5-10) 30, 86, 148, 198, 240, 292 (1970);
Logan, Missouri's Evolving Securities Law and Regulations-Update, 42
U.M.K.C.L. Rev. 341 (1974); Logan, Missouri's New Uniform Securities Act
and Securities Regulation, 37 U.M.K.C.L. Rev. 1 (1969).
8. Missouri Uniform Securities Act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 409.101-.418 (1969).
The Act requires that all transactions defined as a "security" by § 409.401(t)
be registered with the Commissioner of Securities before that security can
be sold or offered for sale in the state. Even after registration the Commis-




to enjoin enforcement of the Act, asserting that the purchase agree-
ment was not a "security." Upon adverse judgment, Florida Realty
appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, contending that the lower
court had misconstrued the Securities Act's definition of a "security."
Appellant argued that its sales transactions did not involve any of
the instruments listed in the definitional section,9 particularly the
"foreign real estate security" provision,"0 nor possess the attributes
of an "investment contract.",' Appellant asserted that it was selling
unfair, unjust, unequitable or oppressive." Id. § 409.306(a)(2)(B)(ii). It
is this power to exclude the offering based on the Commissioner's subjective
evaluation of the "substantive fairness" of the offering that distinguishes a state
securities, or Blue Sky, law from the disclosure philosophy inherent in the
federal securities laws.
9. Id. § 409.401(1); see note 7 supra.
10. "'Security' means .. .any contract or bond for the sale of any interest in
real estate on deferred payments or on installment plans when such real estate is not
situated in this state or in any state adjoining this state . . ." Missouri Uniform
Securities Act, Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.401 (1) (1969). This provision will herein-
after be referred to as the Missouri "foreign real estate security."
11. See note 7 supra. "Investment contracts" are not usually defined in
securities statutes despite their importance in bringing many transactions within
the securities laws. The United States Supreme Court's interpretation, in the
context of federal law, is that "an investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298-99 (1946); cf. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344
(1943). The Howey test has been criticized because (1) it ignores the risk of
loss of the original value furnished by the purchaser, (2) the words "common
enterprise" are ambiguous and tend to fog the central issues involved in identify-
ing a "security," and (3) too much emphasis is placed on the inducement of
future "profits." See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There
a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. R!s. L. REv 367, 374-75 (1967). Pro-
fessor Coffey contends that risk to investment, though not determinative, is
the single most important economic characteristic which distinguishes a security
from other transactions. Id. at 375. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
supra, at 349; SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766
(D. Ore. 1972), aft'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Silver Hills Country Club
v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v.
Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
Most courts have held that contracts providing for the mere sale of an
interest in real property are not "investment contracts." See, e.g., People v.
Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 91 P.2d 892 (1939); In re McCormick's Estate,
284 Ill. App. 543, 1 N.E.2d 769 (1936); McCormick v. Shively, 267 IIl. App.
99 (1932). But see State v. Lorentz, 221 Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313 (1946)
(contract for deed in connection with sale of cemetery lots). See generally 1
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 483-511, 2500-56 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969);
Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1375 (1973); Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 592 (1970).
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land, not securities, arguing that the purchase agreement arose from
the transaction and that even if the purchase agreement was a "se-
curity," it was neither transferred, sold, nor discounted in the course
of the transaction. Therefore, appellant concluded, the Securities
Act was inapplicable to its sales transactions.22 The court rejected
this argument and held that Florida Realty's sale of, or its offer
to sell, land pursuant to an installment purchase agreement came
directly within the statutory language defining a security, 3 i.e. the
"foreign real estate security." Having determined that appellant's
installment purchase agreements were "securities," the court held
that Florida Realty was subject to the requirements of the Securities
Act, including the rules, regulations and orders of the Securities
Commissioner.1" The court noted that when the Act is taken as a
whole, it encompasses not only sales and purchases of securities to
third parties after execution, issuance and delivery, but also offers
by sellers' agents to prospective purchasers to sell a contract such
as appellant's installment purchase agreement.'5
Legislative scrutiny of interstate land sales has resulted in several
regulatory approaches.16 The two principal approaches are "sub-
stantive fairness" and "full disclosure." 7 "Substantive fairness" statutes
12. Brief for Appellant at 35, Florida Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 509 S.W.2d
114 (Mo. 1974).
13. 509 S.W.2d at 117-18.
14. Id. at 117.
15. Id. at 118. See Missouri Uniform Securities Act, Mo. Rav. STAT. §§
409.101, 409.301 (1969). The court also found that the statutory discrim.
ination in § 409.401(l) against sales of land in non-adjoining states was
"arbitrary, artificial, and unreasonable," and, therefore, a denial of equal pro-
tection. The language in the "foreign real estate security" provision of the Act,
note 10 supra, which excluded from the definition of a security any deferred
payment sale of land situated "in any state adjoining this state" was struck from
the statute. 509 S.W.2d at 118-19. The court upheld the statutory distinction
between sales of land within Missouri and of land without Missouri. It con-
cluded that a resident might reasonably be expected to personally inspect in-state
land, while it might be difficult or impossible to travel long distances to inspect
out-of-state land. Id. at 118. Also found to be reasonable was the legislature's
distinction between cash sales and deferred payment sales. Thus cash sales of
out-of-state subdivision lots remain unregulated in Missouri. Id. at 119.
16. See statutes cited note 4 supra.
17. See Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure
Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. Ras. L. Rlv. 5, 14 (1969); Note, Regula-
tion of Interstate Land Sales, 25 STAN. L. Rnv. 605, 608-09 (1973); Note,




require promoters to register with the appropriate authority by pro-
viding specified information about the offering. This information
is usually required to be disclosed to prospective purchasers. 8 More
importantly, the appropriate official may exclude the offering from
distribution in the jurisdiction if he finds that it is "unfair, unjust,
and unequitable."'2 "Full disclosure" statutes, as the name implies,
simply require the promoter to make information relevant to the
property available to the appropriate official. This information is
intended to permit a purchaser to make a rational decision.20
Many state securities laws fall in the "substantive fairness" cate-
gory.21 These laws usually provide two types of protection for
investors. First, unless a security, as defined in the particular statute,
is subject to an exemptive provision,22 registration or state approval
18. See, e.g., Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1704,
1705, 1707 (1970) (requirement of filing a Statement of Record and a Property
Report); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.105, 1710.110 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Missouri Uniform Securities Act, Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.306(a)
(2)(E)(ii) (1969); ef. Prefatory Note to the Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 339-40, which states:
[T]he Act is designed to place individual purchases of large scale promo-
tional land offerings on an equal bargaining basis with the promoter-seller.
It achieves this purpose by providing for the examination of the promotional
offering to determine (1) that it affords full and fair disclosure to prospec-
tive buyers, (2) that the seller can convey unencumbered legal title to the
purchaser, and (3) that there are sufficient safeguards to assure that the
seller will complete the promised offsite improvements on the land.
20. Professors Coffey and Welch raise the argument that full disclosure to
prospective land buyers through prospectus-like selling documents might not
function as well as it does in the securities context. Many securities offerings
filter through a "superstructure of financial sophisticates" who are presumed to
understand the prospectus information. Some securities offerings, however, do
not involve a large selling group of brokers or dealers. Also, a subdivision lot
property report may not be as complex as a securities prospectus. They con-
clude that a prospectus has a "purifying effect" on the one disclosing, notwith-
standing its effect on a prospective purchaser. Coffey & Welch, supra note 17,
at 18-19. For an analysis of the effects of disclosure in the federal securities
scheme see SEC, REPORT ON DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORs-A REAPPRAISAL OF
FEDERAL ADMiNzSTRATrE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (CCH ed.
1969) [commonly called the WHEAT REPORT].
21. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.306 (a) (2) (E) (ii) (1969); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 421:27, 421:29 (1968); OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1707.13
(Page 1964).
22. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 402, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4932
(1971). For example, securities issued by federal, state or municipal governments,
or by federal or state banks are exempted. Id.
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is required before the security may be distributed.2 3 Second, even if
the exemptive provisions apply, distribution and trading of the
security will usually fall within the residual protection of several
anti-fraud provisions, whether or not registration is required.2 4 Florida
Realty illustrates the application of a state securities law (commonly
called Blue Sky Laws) to protect consumers against possible ex-
ploitation by land promoters with unsubstantial schemes. 2 The
Missouri Act employs the "substantive fairness" requirement. 20
Even in the absence of a "foreign real estate security" provision
like that in the Missouri Act,27 most Blue Sky Laws will still become
operative with respect to sales of subdivision lots, whether located in
the jurisdiction or not, if the sales transaction possesses the attributes
of an "investment contract."28 Furthermore, if a sales transaction
23. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) (registration
required prior to distribution); Uniform Securities Act § 304(c), 1 BLUP. SKY
L. RPs. 4924 (1971) (approval registration statement).
24. See, e.g., Uniform Securities Act §§ 101, 410(a) (2), 1 BLuE SKY L. ReP.
1111 4902, 4940 (1971).
25. Blue Sky Laws are often considered paternalistic, which means that the
appropriate administrative agency, usually by the State Commissioner of Securities,
may comment upon, or even prohibit, an offering because of its unfairness. This
paternalistic purpose has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court:
"The purpose of Blue Sky Laws is to protect the public against the imposition
upon the public of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them."
509 S.W.2d at 117, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
The definitional section of the Missouri Act is identical to § 401 (1) of
the Uniform Securities Act (USA), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4931 (1971), ex-
cept that the USA does not contain a provision similar to Missouri's "foreign
real estate security," note 10 supra. Several Blue Sky Laws are modeled after
the USA. They frequently deviate in many respects from the USA and pre-
date it. The USA was modeled after the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-aa (1970), to promote uniformity of application among jurisdictions. Tha
first comprehensive licensing system applicable to securities and persons engaging
in the securities business was enacted in Kansas in 1911. Law of Mar. 10,
1911, ch. 133 [1911] Kan. Laws 210 (repealed 1915). See 1 BLUE Sxy L.
REP. 501 (1973). By enacting the Securities Act of 1933, Congress sought to
complement the state acts by regulating securities concurrently with the states;
it did not preempt the field. L. Loss & E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw 1, 237
n.1 (1958).
26. See Missouri Uniform Securities Act, Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.306(a) (2) (E)
(ii) (1969).
27. See, e.g., id. § 409.401.
28. See note 11, supra. For example, if a subdivision lot is sold in connection
with an "investment pool" or a "leaseback" arrangement, or if the purchaser
agrees to purchase the lot with an expectation of appreciation in value due to the
promoter's efforts at improving the area of which the lot is a part, the transaction




possesses the attributes of an "investment contract" and is sold through
the mails or with the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
it may also be subject to the federal securities laws.29
If interstate sales of subdivision lots do not constitute "securities"
under either state or federal securities law, they may still come within
the ambit of legislation regulating land sales. The federal initiative
is represented by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of
1967 (ILSFDA). While not a securities law, the ILSFDA follows
certain regulatory approaches found in securities law. As its name
suggests, the ILSFDA is a "full disclosure" regulatory statute, rather
than a paternalistic "substantive fairness" law. The Act requires
promoters to file a Statement of Record,-' which is analogous to a
securities registration statement, with the Office of Interstate Land
Sales Registration (OILSR) 32 before offering for sale or lease fifty or
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (sale of units in citrus grove develop-
ment with contract under which seller will manage the unit); State v. Hofacre,
206 Minn. 167, 288 N.W. 13 (1939) (investment pool); State v. Evans, 154 Minn.
95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922) (contract for sale of land subject to purchaser's option
to surrender or convert). See also Real Estate Syndications, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967), 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. RP. 1046 (1973).
29. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-1 (1970).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §Z 1701-03 (Supp.
IV, 1974). For commentary on the ILSFDA see Coffey & Welch, supra note 17;
Ellis, Land Sales Full Disclosure Laws: Federal and Illinois, 60 ILL. B.J. 16
(1971); Morris, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: Analysis and
Evaluation, 24 S.C.L. REv. 331 (1972); Comment, A Handbook to the Inter-
state Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 27 ARK. L. Rnv. 65 (1973); Note, S.
275-The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERs L. REv. 714
(1967); Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulation: The Case for an Expanded
Federal Role, 6 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 511 (1973).
31. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act §§ 1405, 1406, 15 U.S.C. §3
1704, 1705 (1970). The format and instructions for completing the Statement
of Record are found at 24 C.F.R. 3 1710.105 (1975).
32. OILSR was placed in the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) by the Act. The 1966 bill which resulted in this Act originally envisaged
administration by the SEC, rather than by HUD. Manuel F. Cohen, the Chair-
man of the SEC, testified before Congress that the SEC was well-equipped to
administer interstate land sales regulation (in many states today subdivision lot
sales are regulated by Securities Commissioners), since the proposed disclosure
act followed the basic pattern of the Securities Act of 1933. See Hearings on
S. 275 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-53 (1967). See also PAULSON, supra note 1,
at 170-71. The early performance of OILSR has been considered less than
vigorous by some -writers. Id. at 171-87; see Note, Interstate Land Sales Regula-
tions, supra note 17, at 129. OILSR has become more active since 1972 under
1975]
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more 3 subdivision lots by means of the mails or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce,34 unless the offered property falls within an
exemptive provision. 35 Promoters must also provide prospective pur-
chasers with an approved Property Report,30 which is analogous to
a securities prospectus, that contains a detailed listing of facts deemed
relevant to the offering by the OILSR. Failure by promoters to com-
ply with the registration or disclosure requirements, or the use by
promoters of fraudulent sales practices, can lead to criminal penal.
ties3 7 or to civil actions instituted by either purchasers s- or OILSR.3
A "full disclosure" statute at the state level is the Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act (ULSPA).-40 The ULSPA was approved in final
the administration of George K. Bernstein. It recently promulgated stricter
regulations for disclosure and advertising by land promoters. 24 C.F.R. §§
1700-1720.530 (1975). These changes are discussed in Ellsworth, AILSR Tightens
the Regulatory Screws, 4 REAL ESTATE RaV. No. 1, at 106, 111 (1974); Note,
Interstate Land Sales Regulations, supra note 17.
33. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act § 1403(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. §
1702(a) (1) (1970).
34. Id. § 1404, 15 U.S.C. § 1703, (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
35. Id. § 1403, 15 U.S.C. § 1702, (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
36. The Property Report must be filed with the Statement of Record and
approved by the OILSR before distribution. 24 C.F.R. § 1710.20 (1975). The
instructions for preparing the Property Report are found at id. § 1710.110.
37. Upon conviction for willfully violating provisions of the Act, a developer
can be fined not more than $5000 and/or be imprisoned for not more than five
years. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act § 1418, 15 U.S.C. § 1717
(1970).
38. An injured buyer can sue for damages resulting from a sale in violation
of the Act, or he may rescind the contract if he does not receive a Property
Report before signing the contract. Id. §§ 1404(b), 1410, 15 U.S.C. §§
1703(b), 1709 (1970), as amended, 15. U.S.C. § 1703(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
These remedies are in addition to any rights or remedies available at law or in
equity. Id. § 1414, 15 U.S.C. § 1713 (1970).
39. The Secretary of HUD may suspend the effectiveness of a developer's
Statement of Record if it appears to be incomplete or inaccurate. Id. § 1407,
15 U.S.C. § 1706 (1970). If the OILSR believes that any developer is violat-
ing or is about to violate the provisions of the Act, it may seek an injunction
against the practices. Id. § 1415(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1970).
40. HANDnoox, supra note 4, at 339-61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
478.011-.33 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3301 to -3323 (Supp.
1974). Other states that have followed this model are set out in note 4 supra.
For a state statute similar in operation to the ULSPA see California Out-of-
State Land Promotions Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10249-49.5 (Deering
Cum. Supp. 1973), which makes applicable to out-of-state subdivision offerings
the "substantive fairness" requirement of the California Real Property Securities
Dealers Law, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10238.4 (Deering Cum. Supp. 1973).
The California approach, which is discussed in 39 L.A.B. BULL. 332 (1964),




form by its drafters in 1966,41 two years prior to the enactment of
the ILSFDA. Promoters satisfying the jurisdictional requirements
must apply for registration if they offer for sale land situated outside
the state, as well as when in-state land is the subject of the offering.42
A public offering statement is required to afford full and fair dis-
closure to purchasers.43 The agency administering the Act is given
41. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 127. With the advent of ILSFDA, the
ULSPA drafters apparently abandoned their efforts toward further revision of
the ULSPA. The Executive Committee of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws voted on August 6, 1970, to accept a recom-
mendation that the Special Committee on Model Land Sales Practices Act,
which had begun its work in 1965, be discharged. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 105 (1970).
42. Dispositions of subdivided lands are subject to this Act and the [courts]
of this State have jurisdiction in claims or causes of action arising under this
Act, if:
(1) the subdivided lands offered for disposition are located in this
State; or
(2) the subdivider's principal office is located in this State; or(3) any offer or disposition of subdivided lands is made in this
State, whether or not the offeror or offeree is then present in this State,
if the offer originates within this State or is directed by the offeror to
a person or place in this State and received by the person or at the
place to which it is directed.
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 17, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 359-60.
A "disposition" is defined as follows: "When used in this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires: (1) 'disposition' includes sale, lease, assignment, award by
lottery, or any other transaction concerning a subdivision, if undertaken for
gain or profit." Id. § 1, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 341. (emphasis added).
Thus, if a particular transaction does not constitute a "disposition" under the
Act, the jurisdictional requirement is not met. The question of defining a
disposition bears similarity to the question of defining a security. See note 53
infra. Finally, the ULSPA exempts specified dispositions. For example, a
disposition of fewer than 25 separate lots offered by a person in a 12-month
period or a subdivision in which the plan of disposition is to dispose to ten
or fewer persons will be exempted. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 3(a) (2),
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 343.
43. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 6, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 348-49.
This disclosure requirement is copied from N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw. art. 9A, §
338.1 and Rules and Regulations of the Florida Installment Land Sales Board,
ch. 188-6. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 6, Drafters' Comment, HAND-
BOOK, supra note 4, at 348. The Public Offering Statement is analogous to a
securities prospectus and the Property Report required in the ILSFDA. It re-
quires full and accurate disclosure of the physical characteristics of the sub.
divided lands offered and further requires them to be made known to prospective
purchasers all unusual and material circumstances or features affecting the sub-
divided lands.
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power to issue cease and desist orders44 and to revoke registration.45
The Act provides criminal penalties46 against violators and civil
remedies47 for injured purchasers in addition to common law reme-
dies.4s
Florida Realty is a proper interpretation of Missouri Law. It will
probably be of limited precedential value elsewhere, however, because
it interprets a Blue Sky provision common to few jurisdictions. 4
Florida Realty indicates certain shortcomings of the Missouri approach
to regulation of out-of-state subdivision offerings. It is significant
that cash sales of foreign subdivision lots remain unregulated by the
Act.50 The case does, however, demonstrate the versatility of securi-
ties laws in regulating transactions not commonly associated with
"securities." At the same time it highlights the fact that regulation
of certain out-of-state subdivision offerings as "securities" may be a
trap for the unwary land promoter who may overlook the possibility
that land sold pursuant to an installment agreement may be a
"security." As noted earlier, many securities statutes define "security"
to include an "investment contract"51 which has been interpreted
to include certain transactions involving offers of subdivision lots
when the transaction possesses the economic realities of a security,
regardless of the form of the contract. But where the "investment
contract" fails to bring certain subdivision offerings under the securi-
ties law, either the definition must be amended to include such
44. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 12, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 354-55.
45. Id. § 13, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 355-56.
46. Id. § 15, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 357-58.
47. Id. § 16, HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 358-59. Portions of § 16 are mod-
eled after § 410 of the Uniform Securities Act, 1 BLUE SKY L. RPp. 4940.
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 16, Drafters' Comments, HANDBOOK, supra
note 4, at 358-59.
48. Uniform Land Sales Practices Act § 16(b), HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at
358.
49. Maine, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont and Washington are the only states with
a provision similar to Missouri's "foreign real estate security." See notes 4, 10
supra. These states do not distinguish between cash and deferred payment land
sales as Missouri does. Nor do they discriminate against sales of land located in
non-contiguous states, except that Ohio and Tennessee exempt from the out-of-
state classification sales of land located not more than 25 miles beyond their
borders. OHIO LEV. CODE ANN. § 1707.33 (H) (4) (Page Supp. 1973); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-1602(J) (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974). Kansas repealed
a land qua security provision in 1969. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1252(j) (Supp.
1972), amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1252(j) (1964).
50. 509 S.W.2d at 119.




offerings, as Missouri chose to do, or alternative regulatory legislation,
such as the ULSPA, should be adopted. The latter approach ap-
pears to be preferred by most states.52 If "security" were defined to
include sales of or offers to sell subdivision lots, the requirements of
registration, disclosure and substantive fairness may be unnecessarily
applied to sales transactions that do not possess the characteristics
of a security and that the securities laws were not intended to
regulate. 53
Many jurisdictions have enacted land sales or subdivision laws,
while some have altered existing securities laws. The result has
been a lack of uniformity in regulation that has probably contributed
to higher land prices and erratic regulation among the several states.,"
52. See note 4 supra.
53. Many securities statutes begin their definitional sections with the phrase
"unless the context otherwise requires." See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2,
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970); Missouri Uniform Securities Act, Mo. Rzv. STAT.§ 409.401(l) (1969). Professor Coffey argues that this introductory phrase,
which is present in many definitional sections, seems to sanction the use of
an overriding test for identifying a security, rather than the use of the literal
or formal aspects of the statute. He suggests that definitional sections might
be amended to state the general and controlling test for a security in terms
of the "economic realities" formula. See Coffey, supra note 11, at 407 &
n.183. Presumably, the Commissioner of Securities should bear the burden of
proving that a given transaction possesses the attributes of a security under an
"economic realities" test in accordance with the paternalistic role he plays in
administering the Blue Sky Law.
Analogously, in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), the Supreme Court
adhered to its previous expansive concept of "security" and held that a with-drawable capital share in a savings and loan association came within the
definitional section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In Tcherepnin the Court
declared that "'the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and com-
monplace.'" 389 U.S. at 338, quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 351. The Court also reiterated the oft-quoted words from Howey: "'As used
in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, security embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise
of profits.'" 389 U.S. at 338, quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299.
Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
54. Promoters' costs are likely to be increased when operating in several
states due to three factors: attorneys' fees in connection with multi-state com-
pliance, registration fees in each state, and expenses associated with flying
various state officials to the site for inspection and appraisal of the offered
property. These costs are likely to be shifted to consumers. See Note, Regula-
tion of Interstate Land Sales, supra note 17, at 607 n.24. Consider Missouri
Securities Rule IV-J(a) (11), which requires an application for registration of
foreign real estate securities to include, inter alia, the "a]ssurance of an
authorized officer that the fees and expenses of any on-site inspection of the
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The further adoption of a model statute, such as the Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act, or federal preemption of interstate land sales
might close many existing gaps in coverage.55
Jere L. Loyd
real estate, required by the Commissioner, will be borne by the applicant, and
advanced upon request." 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 28604 (1974). This rule
illustrates the type of financial burden in addition to customary costs that may
be placed on a promoter by the Commissioner in effectuating the Act.
55. For an argument for federal preemption of interstate land sales regulation
see Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulation: The Case for an Expanded Federal
Role, supra note 30.
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